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Abstract
Privacy protection is absolutely imperative for data releases when the utilization of public data and big data is getting popular. 
In this paper, data anonymization methods using rough set-based rule induction are investigated. It has been shown that many 
rules with imprecise conclusions can improve the classification accuracy of the rule-based classifier. Data anonymization 
methods utilizing rules with imprecise conclusions are proposed. The data tables anonymized by one of the proposed methods 
can preserve the classification accuracy of the rules induced from them. The proposed methods as well as conventional data 
anonymization methods are compared from two viewpoints: the classification accuracy of rules induced from the anonymized 
data table and the preservation of data anonymity. The results show the usefulness of the proposed methods.
Keywords Rule induction · Imprecise rules · Privacy protection · Data anonymization
1 Introduction
As information systems, sensor technologies and data stor-
age equipments are developed and spread into many fields, 
various kind of data are stored and utilized for discovering 
some new knowledge. This leads to a high requirement for 
research and development of machine learning, data min-
ing and knowledge discovery. For scientific developments 
by knowledge discovery from data, data publication and 
exchange are getting popular. This makes privacy protec-
tion absolutely imperative for data releases. Many privacy 
preservation techniques (Fung et al. 2010; Torra 2017) have 
been proposed. Applying privacy protection techniques, the 
quality as well as the usefulness of the original data are dete-
riorated. Balancing the privacy protection ability and the 
data quality preservation is a difficult issue.
Data privacy has also been considered in data mining 
(Mendes and Vilela 2017; Abidi et al. 2019; Lekshmy and 
Rahiman 2019). Privacy protection has been considered 
extensively in the context of associate rule mining (Rizvi 
and Haritsa 2002; Evfimuievski et al. 2004). In this paper, 
we focus on methods for privacy protection when rough set 
approaches (Pawlak 1982) are applied to data mining. By 
means of rough sets, we find consistent objects and con-
flicting objects in data tables. Several methods for inducing 
decision rules from consistent objects have been proposed 
based on rough sets. In decision rule induction based on 
rough sets, minimal length rules are obtained from data 
tables called decision tables, in which attributes are divided 
into two kinds: condition attributes and decision attributes. 
Condition attributes are the attributes used to describe the 
profiles and characters of objects and used for describing 
the premises, while decision attributes are the attributes 
showing the results of classifications/evaluations and used 
for describing the conclusions. An induced decision rule 
is usually accurate so that all objects satisfying its premise 
take same decision attribute value specified in its conclusion. 
Although decision rule induction has been studied for a long 
time in rough set community, the aspects related to privacy 
have not yet been investigated in detail. We may found only 
a few studies (Ye et al. 2013; Inuiguchi et al. 2015; Inui-
guchi and Washimi 2019) on data privacy using rough set 
approaches. In order to enhance the usability of anonymous 
data, attribute reduction based on rough sets is utilized in 
an anonymization approach (Ye et al. 2013). The concept of 
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k-anonymity is introduced into rough set-based rule induc-
tion from decision tables with more than two decision attrib-
ute values (Inuiguchi et al. 2015). k-anonymous rules are the 
rules supported by at least k objects in the given table. To 
achieve the k-anonymity, imprecise rules (Inuiguchi et al. 
2015) are utilized. The k-anonymous rules are utilized to 
anonymize a given decision table so as to preserve the use-
fulness of the decision table (Inuiguchi and Washimi 2019).
In this paper, we extend the study on the anonymization 
of decision tables by using the imprecise rules proposed in 
a conference paper (Inuiguchi and Washimi 2019). In this 
method, first k-anonymized decision rules are induced by 
using imprecise rules proposed by Inuiguchi et al. (2015). 
It is shown that the set of k-anonymized decision rules per-
forms well in classification. The anonymized decision table 
called a k-common pattern table is produced by embedding 
several k-anonymous decision rules selected for each con-
sistent object in the original table so as to specify its deci-
sion attribute value uniquely. We note that not all condition 
attribute values are specified by a k-anonymous decision 
rule. If a condition attribute value is not specified, the set of 
the attribute values of k objects supporting the rule is com-
puted. By means of a numerical analysis, we observe a better 
privacy preservation in the k-common pattern tables than 
in the original decision table in the attack on the decision 
attribute with a few revealed condition attributes. Moreover, 
it was observed also that the deterioration of the quality of 
the imprecise rules induced from the table is not very high.
The privacy preservation and the quality are evaluated 
only by comparison with the original decision table. The 
advantage of k-common pattern tables in comparison with 
the conventional k-anonymous tables have not yet been clari-
fied. Moreover, there are two conflicting ideas in building 
k-common pattern tables. One is the idea that a k-common 
pattern table with less difference from the original one is 
better. The other is the totally opposite idea that a k-common 
pattern table with more difference from the original one is 
better. The former idea comes from the quality/usefulness of 
the anonymized table while the latter idea comes from the 
privacy protection. Namely, there are some options in build-
ing k-common pattern tables. The performance differences 
of k-common pattern tables built from those different ideas 
have not yet examined. Attacks on condition attribute values 
have not yet been examined and the assumed attack is only 
based on a shallow analysis. The attack by a deep analysis 
was neither examined at all.
In this paper, four building methods for k-common pat-
tern tables are investigated. In order to compare the con-
ventional methods, we apply two anonymization methods 
based on Mondrian (LeFevre et al. 2005; Torra 2017). We 
compare the performances of four k-common pattern tables 
as well as two anonymization methods based on LeFevre 
et al. (2005) from the viewpoints of the privacy preservation 
and the quality/usefulness of the anonymized tables. The 
quality/usefulness of the anonymized tables is assessed 
by the classification accuracy of a classifier composed of 
imprecise rules induced from the anonymized tables. On 
the other hand, the privacy preservation is evaluated by the 
success ratios of decision and condition attribute attacks. In 
this evaluation, we apply a deep attack to a small decision 
table as well as the shallow attack.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we intro-
duce the rough set approach and the induction of impre-
cise rules. The proposed data anonymization approach 
is described in Sect. 3. The procedures of the proposed 
anonymization methods are explained. In Sect. 4, methods 
and results of numerical experiments are described. Two 
kinds of experiments are executed: one is to examine the 
usefulness of the anonymized data tables and the other is to 
investigate the privacy protection abilities of the anonymized 
data tables. Some concluding remarks are given in Sect. 5.
2  Rough set approach and imprecise rule 
induction
Rough set approaches provide useful tools for analyzing 
decision tables. A decision table is a data table defined by a 
four-tuple DT = ⟨U,C ∪ {d},V , f ⟩ , where U is a finite set of 
objects, C is a finite set of condition attributes, d is a deci-
sion attribute, V =
⋃
a∈C∪{d} Va with attribute value set Va 
of attribute a ∈ C ∪ {d} and f ∶ U × C ∪ {d} → V  is called 
an information function which is a total function. Condi-
tion attributes are attributes characterizing objects by their 
values. Namely, the profile of an object is represented by 
condition attribute values. Decision attribute shows a class 
to which the object belongs.
A very simple decision table is illustrated in Table 1. In 
Table  1, U = {o1, o2, o3, o4, o5, o6} , C = {sex, occupation,
domicile} , d = evaluation , Vsex = {male, female} , Voccupation
= {salesman, engineer} , Vdomicile = {Osaka, Tokyo, Fukuoka} 
and Vevaluation = {high, low,medium} . The information func-
tion f is defined by the table as f (o1, occupation) = salesman , 
f (o3, domicile) = Tokyo , f (o4, evaluation) = medium , and 
so on. Using decision attribute value vd
j
∈ Vd , we define 
Table 1  An example of decision table
Object Sex Occupation Domicile Evaluation
o
1
male salesman Osaka high
o
2
male salesman Tokyo high
o
3
female salesman Tokyo low
o
4
female engineer Fukuoka medium
o
5
male engineer Osaka low
o
6
male salesman Fukuoka high
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decision class Dj ⊆ U  by Dj = {u ∈ U ∣ f (u, d) = vdj } , 
j = 1, 2,… , p . On the other hand, equivalence classes are 
defined by using condition attr ibutes A ⊆ C  as 
[u]A = {x ∈ U ∣ f (x, a) = f (u, a), ∀a ∈ A} . [u]A is the set of 
objects in U having the same attribute values as u in A.
Under a decision table, given a set of condition attributes 
A ⊆ C , the lower and upper approximations of an object set 
X ⊆ U is defined by
[u]A ⊆ X implies that all objects in U having the same 
attribute values as u in A belong to X. On the other hand, 
[u]A ∩ X ≠ � implies that there exists at least one object 
in X which has the same attribute values as u in A. Thus, 
A∗(X) is composed of consistent members of X and 
A∗(X) is composed of possible members of X. The pair 
(A∗(X),A
∗(X)) is called the rough set of X with respect to 
A ⊆ C . In the decision table shown in Table 1, for example, 
we obtain A∗(D1) = {o1.o6} and A∗(D1) = {o1, o2, o3, o6} , 
where  we def ine  A = {occupation, domicile} and 
D1 = {o ∈ U ∣ f (o, d) = high} = {o1, o2, o6}.
In rough set approaches (Pawlak 1991), the attribute 
reduction and the minimal length rule induction are investi-
gated well. In this paper, we utilize a rule induction method 
based on rough sets. In the decision table shown in Table 1, 
we find a decision rule “if sex = male, occupation = sales-
man and domicile=Osaka then evaluation = high”. However, 
this is not a minimal because we find a decision rule “if 
sex  =  male and occupation  =  salesman then evalua-
tion = high” which has a shorter premise. This decision rule 
is a minimal length rule because there is no rule with shorter 
premise. In the rough set approach, such minimal length rules 
are induced. We use MLEM2 algorithm (Grzymala-Busse 
2002) for inducing minimal length rules from a given deci-
sion table. By this algorithm, we obtain minimal set of rules 
with minimal conditions which can explain all objects in 
lower approximations of X under a given decision table. 
MLEM2 is a rule induction algorithm accommodating 
numerical/ordinal attributes as well as nominal/categorical 
attr ibutes. Therefore, rules of the form of “if 
vL
1
≤ f (u, a1) ≤ v
R
1
 , … and vL
s
≤ f (u, as) ≤ v
R
s
 and f (u, b1) = w1 
… f (u, bt) = wt then u ∈ X ”, where a1,… , as ∈ C are numer-
ical/ordinal attributes and b1,… , bt ∈ C are nominal/cate-
gorical attributes. Namely, MLEM2 treats numerical/ordinal 
condition attributes by putting the condition expressed by 
intervals of attribute values in the premises of rules. For X, 
we usually substitute a decision class Dj , j ∈ {1, 2,… , p} . 
Then we apply MLEM2 usually to each decision class Dj , 
j = 1, 2,… , p so that we obtain a minimal set of rules with 
minimal conditions, ‘if condition Hl
j
 is satisfied then the 
object is in a class Dj ’, l = 1, 2,… ,mj j = 1, 2,… , p , where 
Hl
j
 is a minimal condition described by condition attributes 
(1)
A∗(X) = {u ∈ U ∣ [u]A ⊆ X}, A
∗(X) = {u ∈ U ∣ [u]A ∩ X ≠ �}.
to infer the membership of Dj and mj is the number of rules 
inferring the membership of Dj in the minimal set of rules 
induced by MLEM2. Using the set of those induced decision 
rules, we can build a classifier based on LERS system (Grzy-
mala-Busse 1992).
When p > 2 (p is the number of decision classes), we 
may induce rules for a union of Dj ’s by MLEM2 (see (Ham-
akawa and Inuiguchi 2014)). For example, when we con-
sider a union D1 ∪ D2 , we can induce rules ‘if condition 
Hl
12
 is satisfied then the object belongs to union D1 ∪ D2 ’, 
l = 1, 2,… ,m12 , where m12 is the number of rules induced 
by MLEM2 with respect to D1 ∪ D2 . We may consider any 
union of 
⋃
j∈J Dj and we obtain rules inferring the mem-
bership of the union, i.e., ‘if condition Hl
J
 is satisfied then 
the object belongs to union 
⋃
j∈J Dj ’, l = 1, 2,… ,mJ , where 
j ∈ J ⊆ {1, 2,… , p} and mJ is the number of rules induced 
by MLEM2 with respect to 
⋃




such a rule is satisfied with an object, from the rule, we 
know that the object belongs to one of decision classes Dj , 
j ∈ J . Namely, from the rule, we know imprecisely the class 
including the object.
The decision rule having a union of decision classes in its 
conclusion is called an ‘imprecise decision rule’, or shortly, 
an ‘imprecise rule’. In contrast with an imprecise rule, we 
call usual decision rules with a single decision class ‘pre-
cise decision rules’, or shortly, ‘precise rules’. Although 
each imprecise rule can conclude the decision class only 
imprecisely, it works well for object classification by inter-
secting the imprecise conclusions of different imprecise 
rules. For example, the imprecise rules shown in Table 2 
can be obtained from Table 1. We note that in Table 2 the 
notation such as ‘evaluation = (low or medium)’ is used 
instead of ‘the object belongs to the union of class [low] and 
class [medium]’ for the sake of simplicity. Under imprecise 
rules in Table 2, we can conclude “an object with occupa-
tion = engineer and domicile = Fukuoka is evaluated as 
medium”, “an object with occupation = salesman and domi-
cile = Fukuoka is evaluated as high”, and so on. Therefore, 
we may build a classifier using imprecise rules in a similar 
way to LERS [see (Hamakawa and Inuiguchi 2014)], where 
LERS provides a method for classifying any object by using 
Table 2  Imprecise rules found in Table 1
Name Imprecise rule
I1 If sex = female then evaluation = (low or medium)
I2 If occupation = engineer then evaluation = (low or medium)
I3 If sex = male then evaluation = (low or high)
I4 If occupation = salesman then evaluation = (low or high)
I5 If domicile = Fukuoka, then evaluation = (medium or high)
I6 If sex = male and occupation = salesman then 
evaluation=(medium or high)
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precise rules. Hamakawa and Inuiguchi (2014) demonstrated 
that the classifier using imprecise rules performs better than 
the classifier using precise rules.
Consider a situation where the publication of induced 
decision rules are requested. Such rule publication may be 
important and necessary for showing the fair and reasonable 
treatment of objects as well as for knowledge exchange. If 
rule r is supported only by a few objects, attribute values 
shown in rule r identify a few objects. If sensitive data are 
included in rule r, this identification invades privacy. From 
the viewpoint of data privacy, we cannot publish such rules, 
i.e., rules supported by a few objects. On the other hand, 
hiding such rules due to the privacy protection may bring 
an insufficient knowledge exchange and a sense of distrust. 
Because of missing rules, the classification of some objects 
cannot be explained well by the published rules. We call 
rule r a k-anonymous rule if r is supported by not less than k 
objects, where k is the minimally required number to protect 
the privacy.
As the number of objects in a union of classes is bigger 
than the number of objects in a single class, objects sup-
porting an imprecise rule r inferring the membership of 
a union 
⋃
j∈J Dj ( J ⊆ {1, 2,… , p} ) is usually more than a 
precise rule r′ inferring the membership of Di ( i ∈ J ). As 
J enlarges, 
⋃
j∈J Dj become large and thus the number of 
objects supporting imprecise rules inferring the membership 
of 
⋃
j∈J Dj increases. Therefore, imprecise rules satisfies the 
k-anonymity more often than precise rules. If the objects 
supporting precise rules violating the k-anonymity are clas-
sified correctly by some k-anonymous imprecise rules, the 
replacement of precise rules violating the k-anonymity with 
those k-anonymous imprecise rules in the published rules 
can keep the classification quality. From this point of view, 
Inuiguchi et al. (2015) proposed an induction method for 
k-anonymous rules by utilizing imprecise rules, and showed 
the advantage of this approach.
3  The proposed data anonymization 
methods
We propose a data anonymization method for decision 
tables based on k-anonymous rules as an extension of the 
method proposed by Inuiguchi and Washimi (2019). We 
assume that the original decision table has more than two 
decision classes ( p > 2 ) and that a set of k-anonymous 
rules induced from it is given (if not, we may induce 
those rules by the k-anonymous rule induction method 
(Inuiguchi et al. 2015)). The proposed anonymized table 
is composed of patterns each of which is expressed by a 
combination of imprecise attribute values. It is produced 
by embedding k-anonymous rules. Each imprecise pattern 
in the proposed table has at least k supporting objects in 
the original decision table (we call this property “k-com-
monality”). In this way, the proposed anonymized table 
preserves data privacy and is called a ‘k-common pattern 
table’.
The k-common pattern table is similar to a set of k-anon-
ymous rules but they are different. The k-common pattern 
table is composed of patterns. A pattern in the k-common 
pattern table specifies all condition and decision attribute 
values by value sets. On the other hand, a k-anonymous rule 
usually specify value sets of a part of condition attributes 
and the decision attribute. As described later, each pattern in 
the k-common pattern table is produced from a k-anonymous 
rule. However, there is no guarantee that all k-anonymous 
rules are used for producing patterns in the k-common pat-
tern table. Moreover, the specified condition attribute value 
sets in k-anonymous rules can be a proper superset of the 
corresponding value sets of the pattern in the k-common 
pattern table. Usually only a part of k-anonymous rules are 
used to produce a k-common pattern table.
Before describing the algorithm for producing a k-com-
mon pattern table, we briefly describe the idea. Roughly 
speaking, a k-common pattern table is produced by embed-
ding many of k-anonymous rules. Because k-anonymous 
rules necessary for the classification of objects consistent 
with the original table are embedded, it may preserve the 
quality of rules inducible from the proposed anonymized 
table. First, from a set of k-anonymous rules, a set of min-
imally necessary rules are selected for each object in the 
original table so as to specify its decision attribute value 
precisely. From each selected rule, we produce a pattern by 
putting the attribute values if they are specified in the rule, 
and a set of attribute values of k objects supporting the rule 
otherwise. We repeat this procedure for all selected rules of 
an object and for all objects in the original table, and as a 
result, we obtain a k-common pattern table. In this proce-
dure, there are some options with different strategies. One is 
quality/usefulness-oriented strategy and the other is privacy 
protection-oriented strategy.
Let Cl(u|R) be the set of the inferred values for decision 
attribute value of u ∈ U under rule set R. The proposed pro-
cedure for building k-common pattern tables from a given 
decision table DT = ⟨U,C ∪ {d},V , f ⟩ under a set R of 
k-anonymous rules is as follows:
 (i) Let cT = ⟨⟨P,C ∪ {d},V , ⟩⟩ be a k-common pattern 
table corresponding to DT, where P is a set of pat-
terns and  ∶ P × C ∪ {d} →
⋃
a∈C∪{d} 2
Va , 2Va is the 
power set of Va , a ∈ C ∪ {d} . Initialize P = �.
 (ii) For each object u ∈ U  , obtain a minimal set 
R(u) ⊆ R of k-anonymous rules such that 
Cl(u|R(u)) = Cl(u|R) . Execute (a) and (b):
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(a) If R(u) = � , terminate this procedure for u ∈ U.
(b) For each rule r ∈ R(u) , we select k objects sup-
porting r and produce an imprecise pattern pt 
respectively by routines (s1)–(s3) and (s4)–(s7) 
described in what follows. Update P = P ∪ {pt} . 
Return to (a).
In (ii), if the decision class of object u is estimated well by 
rule set R , Cl(u|R) is a singleton. Otherwise, Cl(u|R) is 
a set of multiple decision attribute values or an emptyset. 
Cl(u|R) = � implies no matching rules in R for object u.
The number of elements of P can be larger than the 
number of elements in U. Namely, we obtain a larger table 
cT than the original decision table DT. The existence of 
k objects supporting a rule r ∈ R(u) is guaranteed by the 
k-anonymity of r when R(u) ≠ �.
In this paper, the following routine (s1)–(s3) is applied 
to the selection of k objects supporting r at (b) of (ii) in the 
proposed procedure:
 (s1) Initialize OB ⊆ U by the set of objects supporting r 
except u, and O(r) = �.
 (s2) Select an object u′ from OB which maximizes/mini-
mizes the number of condition attribute values com-
mon in u and u′ . If a tie occurs, select the first one 
among them. Update O(r) = O(r) ∪ {u�}.
 (s3) If |O(r)| < k , update OB = OB − {u�} and return to 
(s2), where |Y| is the cardinality of set Y.
At step (s2), there are two options in the selection of u′ . 
If we select it with the maximal number of common condi-
tion attribute values, the obtained k-common pattern table 
preserves attribute values more precisely. On the other hand, 
if we select it with the minimal number of common condi-
tion attribute values, the obtained k-common pattern table 
becomes more ambiguous. Routine (s1)–(s3) is expressed as 
a flowchart in Fig. 1. Repeating routine (s1)–(s3) for each 
r ∈ R(u) , we obtain O(r), r ∈ R(u) , where O(r) is a set of k 
objects supporting rule r. Given R(u) and O(r), r ∈ R(u) , a 
pattern pt at (b) of (ii) in the proposed procedure is com-
posed by routine (s4)–(s7) described later. By the follow-
ing routine (s4)–(s7), a value set (pt, a) for each attribute 
a ∈ C ∪ {d} in pattern pt corresponding to r ∈ R(u) is deter-
mined under given R(u) and O(r�) , r� ∈ R(u).
 (s4) Let C̃ = C . The value set (pt, d) of decision attribute 
d in pt is defined by the set of decision attribute values 
specified in the conclusion of r.
 (s5) Take a condition attribute a ∈ C̃.
 (s5-a) If a appears in r, determine the value set (pt, a) 
by the value set specified in r for a ∈ C and go 
to (s6).
 (s5-b) If a is absent in all r� ∈ R(u) , determine the 
value set (pt, a) by the following way and go to 
(s6): if a is numerical/ordinal, (pt, a) =
⋃
r�∈R(u)[
{f (u, a) ∣ u ∈ O(r�)}
]
 , and if a is nominal, 
(pt, a) =
⋃
r�∈R(u){f (u, a) ∣ u ∈ O(r
�)}.
 (s5-c) Determine the value set (pt, a) by the follow-
ing way and go to (s6): if a is numerical/ordinal, 
(pt, a) =
[
{f (u, a) ∣ u ∈ O(r)}
]
 , and if a is nomi-
nal, (pt, a) = {f (u, a) ∣ u ∈ O(r)}.
 (s6) This step is optional. For each r� ∈ R(u) , update 
(pt, a) in the following way: if a appears in r′ while 
not in that of r, update (pt, a) by a union of (pt, a) 
and the value set specified in r′ for a.
 (s7) Update C̃ = C̃ − {a} . If C̃ = � , terminate this routine. 
Otherwise, return to (s5).
In routine (s4)–(s7), 
[
{f (u, a) ∣ u ∈ O(r)}
]
 for numeri-
cal/ordinal attribute a is the minimal interval covering 
{f (u, a) ∣ u ∈ O(r)}.
Step (s6) is optional, if we adopt (s6), the k-common pat-
tern table obtained has more imprecise values, i.e., the value 
set (pt, a) is larger. Thus it would protect the privacy more 
while deteriorate the quality/usefulness of the k-common 
pattern table. We note that some k-common patterns may 
max min
YesNo
Fig. 1  Determination of O(r) under given u and r ∈ R(u)
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be produced multiple times in the procedure. We may delete 
overlapped patterns. Routine (s4)–(s7) is expressed as a 
flowchart in Fig. 2.
As described in the previous section, we have options at 
steps (s2) and (s6) and thus we have four methods shown 
in Table 3. Namely, we consider four methods denoted by 
cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4. Among those, cT1 corresponds to 
the one proposed by Inuiguchi and Washimi (Inuiguchi and 
Washimi 2019).
All imprecise rules shown in Table 2 are 2-anonymous 
rules. To illustrate the proposed approach, let us apply the 
procedure described above to the decision table shown in 
Table 1 using 2-anonymous rules shown in Table 2. Select-
ing rules and objects as shown in Table 4, we obtain 2-com-
mon pattern tables shown in Table 5. In the case of Table 1, 
option (s6) does not influence the resulting 2-common pat-
tern tables. The underlined attribute values in Table 5 are 
specified by the used imprecise rules. As shown in Table 5, 
the obtained 2-common pattern tables cT3 and cT4 are more 
imprecise than cT1 and cT2. We note that the underlined 
values do not appear in the published anonymized table. We 
show them for easy verification of the resulting 2-common 
pattern tables.
From both tables shown in Table 5, we may induce impre-
cise rules shown in Table 6, where we note that a condition 
on an attribute is satisfied if the attribute value set in the 
condition includes the attribute value set of a pattern. I8’ is 
induced only from cT1 and cT2 while I8” is induced only 
from cT3 and cT4. Rules I1’ to I6’ and I8’ are induced from 
Table 1 while rules I7’ to I8” are more imprecise than those 
induced from Table 1. From pattern pt′
10
 , no rule is induced. 
We observe that rules are preserved in the 2-common pattern 
tables although there are less rules and weaker. Now let us 
check the privacy protection of 2-common pattern tables in 
Table 5. Because the original table in Table 1 is very small, 
the privacy protection of this example is not very remark-
able. However, we can see that the 2-common pattern tables 
protect some data. For example, if we know sex = female 
and occupation = salesman, we infer domicile = (Tokyo 
or Fukuoka) and evaluation = (low or medium) in Table 5 
while we obtain domicile = Tokyo and evaluation = low 
in Table 1. Similarly, if we know sex = male and occupa-
tion = engineer, we infer domicile = (Osaka or Fukuoka) 
and evaluation = (low or medium) in Table 5 while we 
obtain domicile = Osaka and evaluation = low in Table 1. 















Fig. 2  Determination of pt under given R(u) and O(r�) , r ∈ R(u)
Table 3  Four proposed methods
(s2) Without (s6) With (s6)
Maximize cT1 cT2
Minimize cT3 cT4
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rules inducible from the original table to a certain extent and 
preserve privacy more than the original table.
4  Numerical experiments
4.1  Outline
We investigate the performances of the proposed 
anonymized tables and compare them with the conventional 
anonymized tables. As the conventional anonymized tables, 
we use tables obtained by Mondrian (LeFevre et al. 2005; 
Torra 2017), a method achieving k-anonymity for multidi-
mensional records described in terms of several condition 
attributes. Mondrian is a greedy partitioning algorithm 
recursively selects a condition attribute to partition into two 
sets with the same size until no further partition is needed 
(or possible). Mondrian is usually applied to all objects in 
the given decision table. However, it easily destroys char-
acteristic patterns of decision classes described by condi-
tion attributes. Therefore, we consider also the application 
Table 4  Selected rules and 
objects
cT1 and cT2 cT3 and cT4



















































































































Table 5  2-Common pattern 
tables obtained from Table 1




male salesman Tokyo or Osaka low or high
 pt
2
male salesman Osaka or Fukuoka medium or high
 pt
3
male or female salesman Tokyo low or high
 pt
4
male salesman Tokyo or Fukuoka medium or high
 pt
5
female salesman or engineer Tokyo or Fukuoka low or medium
 pt
6
male or female engineer Osaka or Fukuoka low or medium
 pt
7
male or female salesman or engineer Fukuoka medium or high
 pt
8
male salesman or engineer Osaka low or high
 pt
9




male salesman Tokyo or Osaka low or high
 pt′
2
male salesman Osaka or Fukuoka medium or high
 pt′
3
male or female salesman Tokyo low or high
 pt′
4
male salesman Tokyo or Fukuoka medium or high
 pt′
5
female salesman or engineer Tokyo or Fukuoka low or medium
 pt′
6
male or female salesman Tokyo or Osaka low or high
 pt′
7
male or female engineer Osaka or Fukuoka low or medium
 pt′
8
male or female salesman or engineer Fukuoka medium or high
 pt′
9
male salesman or engineer Tokyo or Osaka low or high
 pt′
10
male salesman or engineer Osaka or Fukuoka low or high
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of Mondrian to each decision class in order to increase the 
preservation probability of the characteristic patterns, i.e., 
to preserve the quality. The usual application of Mondrian 
is denoted by M1 while the application of Mondrian to each 
decision class is denoted by M2. We use four datasets shown 
in Table 7 obtained from the UCI Machine Learning Reposi-
tory (Dua and Graff 2019). We assume that all attribute val-
ues should be anonymized. We apply 10-fold cross valida-
tion methods 10 times for each dataset.
4.2  Quality/usefulness of anonymized table
The proposed k-common pattern tables have good property 
that they can estimate the correct decision attribute values 
of objects in the original decision table if the objects are 
expressed by k-anonymous rules. Namely, the correct values 
are known by intersecting the value sets of decision attribute 
of patterns to which objects are matched. The k-anonymous 
tables obtained by Mondrian do not always have this prop-
erty. However, for new objects, the classification ability 
based on the proposed k-common pattern tables remains 
uncertain.
We suppose that the analysts who can access only 
anonymized tables are interested in knowing the relations 
between condition and decision attributes by inducing deci-
sion rules. Therefore, we evaluate the usefulness of the 
anonymized data tables by the quality of induced decision 
rules. To measure the quality of induced decision rules, we 
use the classification accuracy of a classifier composed of 
these induced decision rules. For the classifier, we utilize 
LERS (Grzymala-Busse 1992, 2002) which is a method 
for classifying any object by using induced decision rules. 
Moreover, we assume that decision rules are induced by the 
following procedure based on MLEM2 (Grzymala-Busse 
2002) with the initial set of elementary conditions composed 
of (i) “ f (x, a) ∈ S ” if a is a nominal/categorical attribute 
and the set S of condition attribute values appears in the 
given table and (ii) “ f (x, a) ≥ vL ” and “ f (x, a) ≤ vR ” if a is 
a numerical/ordinal attribute and the interval [vL, vR] appears 
in the given table:
 (r1) Set j ∶= 1 . Induce set R1 of precise rules for each deci-
sion class Di , i ∈ {1, 2,… , p} from a set of all pat-
terns/objects Qj.
 (r2) Erase patterns/objects explained by rules in Rj . Let 
Qj+1 be the remaining patterns. If Qj+1 = � or j ≥ n , 
terminate this procedure.
 (r3) Update j ∶= j + 1 . Induce set Rj of imprecise 
rules for all combinations of j decision classes Di , 
i ∈ {1, 2,… , p} from a set of patterns/objects Qj . 
Return to (r2).
The obtained results are shown in Table 8. In Table 8, 
‘Ori’ stands for the original decision table. The values 
shown in rows of ‘Ori’ and ‘k-Ori’ are the classification 
accuracies of classifiers composed of decision rules induced 
by MLEM2 (Grzymala-Busse 2002) and those of classifi-
ers composed of k-anonymous rules induced from the origi-
nal decision table, respectively. We note that, as observed 
in reference (Inuiguchi et al. 2015), ‘k-Ori’ is sometimes 
better than ‘Ori’ because of the following reasons: (I) the 
number of k-anonymous rules can be more than that of 
decision rules induced by MLEM2 if k is small, and (II) a 
k-anonymous rule is supported by not less than k objects and 
thus usually more general than a decision rule induced by 
MLEM2. Indeed, we observe such results in datasets ‘car’ 
and ‘hayes-roth’ with k = 5 and ‘car’ with k = 10 . However, 
as k increases, the number of k-anonymous rules decreases 
Table 6  Imprecise rules found in Table 5
Name Imprecise rule
I1′ If sex = female then evaluation = (low or medium)
I2′ If occupation = engineer then evaluation = (low or medium)
I3′ If sex = male and domicile = (Tokyo or Osaka) then evaluation = (low or high)
I4′′ If domicile = Tokyo then evaluation = (low or high)
I5′ If domicile = Fukuoka, then evaluation = (medium or high)
I6′ If occupation = salesman and domicile = (Tokyo or Osaka) then evaluation = (low or high)
I7′ If sex = male and domicile = (Tokyo or Fukuoka) then evaluation = (medium or high)
I8′ If occupation = salesman and domicile = (Osaka or Fukuoka) then evaluation = high (from cT1 and cT2)
I8′′ If occupation = salesman and domicile = (Osaka or Fukuoka) then evaluation = (medium or high) (from cT3 and cT4)
Table 7  Datasets
Dataset |U| |C| |V
d
| Attribute
Car 1728 6 4 Ordinal
Hayes-roth 160 5 3 Ordinal
Iris 150 4 3 Numerical
Zoo 101 16 7 Nominal
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so that the classification ability of a set of k-anonymous rules 
decreases.
As shown in Table 8, the rules induced from the proposed 
k-common pattern tables cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4 are much 
better than those induced from k-anonymized tables M1 and 
M2 based on Mondrian. Tables cT3 and cT4 are less useful 
than tables cT1 and cT2 because the classification accura-
cies of the induced rules are worse. The differences between 
tables cT1 and cT2 as well as between tables cT3 and cT4 
are not very big and we cannot say which tables are better. 
This implies that the adoption of maximization or minimi-
zation at step (s2) influences the usefulness of the obtained 
anonymized table and that the adoption of maximization is 
preferable. Moreover, although the classification accuracies 
of the rules induced from the proposed tables are worse than 
those induced from the original table, the classification accu-
racies do not degrade so much (except for the ‘hayes-roth’ 
data set with k = 10).
4.3  Privacy protection ability against a shallow 
attack
To evaluate the privacy protection ability, we investigate 
to what extent the value of a condition/decision attribute 
is correctly estimated from values of l condition attributes 
of an object, where the values of l condition attributes are 
supposed to be known by the attacker. We consider two esti-
mation methods for the attribute values called shallow and 
deep attacks. A shallow attack tries to find unknown attrib-
ute values of a little known object without a big effort. On 
the other hand, a deep attack tries to find unknown attribute 
values of a little known object with a brute-force serach. A 
shallow attack is supposed to be used when the attacker is 
intersted in unknown attribute values only to some extent 
so that s/he does not invest a lot of her/his time and effort. 
A deep attack is supposed to be used when the attacker is 
interested in unknown attribute values very much so that s/
he is willing to spend a lot of her/his time and effort. We note 
that the proposed k-common pattern tables cT1, cT2, cT3 
and cT4 and the k-anonymized table M2 are designed for 
preserving rules estimating decision attribute values from 
condition attribute values. Therefore, it is difficult to protect 
decision attribute values as the number l of known condition 
attribute values increases.
In the shallow attack, we first select all patterns/objects 
that can take the revealed attribute values in the anonymized 
table. Then we collect the values of attribute we want to 
attack for those selected patterns/objects and take their inter-
section. If the intersection is a singleton and it is the correct 
attribute value of the object, the shallow attack is successful. 
For example, suppose that the domicile of a person listed in a 
common pattern table cT1 in Table 5 is revealed as ‘Tokyo’. 
Then patterns pt1 , pt3 , pt4 and pt5 are selected because they 
can take ‘Tokyo’ for their domicile. Attacking on occupa-
tion, we obtain ‘salesman’ and ‘salesman or engineer’ from 
those patterns. Taking the intersection, we obtain ‘salesman’. 
As a result, we successfully reveal that the person living in 
‘Tokyo’ is ‘salesman’ which is correct as shown in Table 1. 
On the other hand, attacking on sex, we obtain ‘male’, ‘male 
or female’ and ‘female’ and the intersection is empty. There-
fore, the attack on sex of that person is failed.
Because |C| of the datasets treated in our experiments 
are not very large, we set l = 2 . All possible attacks are 
evaluated. The obtained results are shown in Tables 9 and 
10. Table 9 shows the average ratios of successful attacks 
on condition attributes while Table 10 shows the average 
ratios of successful attacks on decision attributes. In those 
tables, k stands for the parameters of k-commonality as well 
as k-anonymity.
As shown in Table 9, the k-anonymized table M1 pro-
tects the condition attribute values more than the proposed 
k-common pattern tables cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4 except for 
Dataset ‘hayes-roth’. The privacy protection ability of the 
k-anonymized table M2 is comparable with that of the k-com-
mon pattern tables cT3 and cT4. The proposed k-common 
pattern tables cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4 perform much better in 
Dataset ‘hayes-roth’ than the k-anonymized tables M1 and 
M2. Roughly speaking, the privacy protection abilities of the 
proposed k-common pattern tables are not very bad although 
they are worse than the k-anonymized table M1.
Table 8  Classification accuracy 
of induced rules from tables
k = 5 k = 10
Car Hayes-roth Iris Zoo Car Hayes-roth Iris Zoo
Ori 0.9867 0.8131 0.9287 0.9643 0.9867 0.8131 0.9287 0.9643
k-Ori 0.9868 0.8400 0.9173 0.9612 0.9897 0.7106 0.9173 0.9437
cT1 0.8854 0.7994 0.9213 0.8583 0.8997 0.6369 0.9233 0.7239
cT2 0.8859 0.8000 0.9213 0.8650 0.8990 0.6394 0.9207 0.7369
cT3 0.8491 0.7969 0.9100 0.7397 0.8633 0.6200 0.9107 0.6739
cT4 0.8474 0.8000 0.9133 0.7023 0.8663 0.6275 0.9213 0.6656
M1 0.7011 0.1925 0.3413 0.0859 0.1152 0.1925 0.3447 0.0554
M2 0.7000 0.4531 0.8713 0.6780 0.7000 0.2806 0.7720 0.4065
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Now we see the results shown in Table  10. The 
k-anonymized table M1 protects the condition attribute 
values more than the proposed k-common pattern tables 
cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4 in all datasets, because table M1 
is anonymized without the consideration of the decision 
classes, i.e., decision attribute values. Therefore, from the 
viewpoint of privacy protection, table M1 is the best but its 
usefulness in rule induction is the worst as we have seen in 
the previous subsection. Comparing the results to those of 
k-anonymized table M2, the privacy protection abilities of 
the proposed k-common pattern tables cT1, cT2, cT3 and 
cT4 are comparable. The proposed tables cT1, cT2, cT3 
and cT4 are better in datasets ‘car’ and ‘hayes-roth’. Among 
the proposed k-common pattern tables cT1, cT2, cT3 and 
cT4, tables cT3 and cT4 are better than tables cT1 and cT2. 
Between cT1 and cT2, as well as between cT3 and cT4, cT2 
is better than cT1 and cT4 is better than cT3. As a summary, 
it is preferable from a privacy perspective to choose ‘mini-
mize’ at step (s2) and adopting step (s6) in the proposed 
algorithm to build a k-common pattern table.
4.4  Privacy protection ability against a deep attack
In this subsection, we describe the results of the deep attack. 
In the shallow attack, we consider the intersection of deci-
sion attribute value sets of all patterns/objects match to the 
known condition attribute values. However, we did not check 
the compatibility among selected patterns/objects. Namely, 
some of the selected patterns/objects can be incompatible, 
i.e., the intersection of value sets of some condition attribute 
can be empty while all of them have the known condition 
attribute values. In the deep attack, we take into account 
the compatibility among selected patterns/objects. The deep 
attack is launched only when the shallow attack fails. The 
procedure of the deep attack is as follows:
 (d0) We assume that attribute a ∈ C ∪ {d} is attacked. 
Let Ua be the set of patterns/objects that match to the 
known attribute values.
 (d1) Calculate a minimal set P ⊆ Ua of mutually compat-
ible patterns/objects which uniquely specify a value 
v̄a of a by their intersection.
Table 9  Success ratios of 
attacking condition attribute 
values by the shallow attack
k cT1 cT2 cT3 cT4 M1 M2
Dataset: car
2 0.1806 0.1815 0.1842 0.1848 0.0418 0.0504
3 0.1736 0.1721 0.1770 0.1790 0.0419 0.1438
4 0.1541 0.1540 0.1539 0.1549 0.0845 0.1907
5 0.1395 0.1395 0.1408 0.1432 0.0845 0.2487
10 0.0598 0.0586 0.0639 0.0639 0.2066 0.2262
15 0.0519 0.0510 0.0570 0.0569 0.0265 0.2023
Dataset: hayes-roth
2 0.0412 0.0409 0.0549 0.0532 0.0299 0.0986
3 0.0394 0.0402 0.0570 0.0563 0.2018 0.2579
4 0.0581 0.0540 0.0752 0.0723 0.2018 0.4326
5 0.0760 0.0744 0.0812 0.0813 0.5223 0.4228
10 0.1431 0.1345 0.1024 0.1066 0.4113 0.0453
15 0.3017 0.3018 0.3393 0.3392 0.4113 0.0196
Dataset: iris
2 0.3053 0.2870 0.2447 0.2345 0.2947 0.1767
3 0.3539 0.3071 0.1622 0.1598 0.0032 0.0627
4 0.3245 0.2915 0.0089 0.0097 0.0032 0.0000
5 0.3036 0.2684 0.0073 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000
10 0.0564 0.0508 0.0050 0.0050 0.0000 0.0000
15 0.0128 0.0128 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dataset: zoo
2 0.7010 0.7001 0.6902 0.6890 0.7028 0.7986
3 0.7249 0.7158 0.7147 0.7093 0.6973 0.7356
4 0.7421 0.7324 0.7079 0.7056 0.5413 0.6810
5 0.7552 0.7332 0.7060 0.6936 0.5413 0.5565
10 0.7588 0.7280 0.6965 0.6857 0.2394 0.3297
15 0.7417 0.7031 0.6834 0.6656 0.0673 0.2061
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 (d2) Obtain a set Q ⊆ Ua by collecting patterns/objects 
whose decision attribute value sets do not include v̄1.
 (d3) For each pattern/object in Q, we check whether the 
values of condition attributes except attribute a match 
to all patterns/objects in P or not. If there is such a 
pattern/object in Q, the value of attribute a cannot be 
uniquely determined and thus, the deep attack fails.
 (d4) Calculate a minimal set S ⊆ Q of mutually compatible 
patterns/objects which uniquely specify a value v̂a of a 
by their intersection. If there is such a set S, the deep 
attack fails because there are at least two possibilities 
of the value of a, i.e., v̄a and v̂a.
 (d5) If the specified value v̄a of attribute a is correct, the 
deep attack is successful.
The set of patterns/objects P and S at step (d1) and (d4) 
can be obtained, for example, by a branch and bound 
method.
Because the deep attack requires a very big computational 
effort, we apply the deep attack only to a small-sized deci-
sion table composed of 15 objects randomly sampled from 
the original dataset. Moreover, we examine the protection 
abilities of anonymized tables with k = 2 , 3 and 4 against 
the deep attack only for the three data sets, ‘car’, ‘hayes-
roth’ and ‘iris’ which have small numbers of attribute values 
both for condition and decision attributes. The deep attack 
is applied when the shallow attack fails.
The results of the deep attack are shown in Tables 11 
and  12. Table  11 shows the obtained success ratios of 
attacking condition attribute values while Table 12 shows 
the obtained success ratios of attacking decision attribute 
values. In both tables, we show the results of the shallow 
attack and the results of the deep attack so that we can see 
to what extent the deep attack works.
As shown in Tables 11 and 12, the deep attack reveals 
significantly more attribute values than the shallow attack. 
In Table 11, we observe that the proposed k-common pattern 
tables cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4 generally protect the attribute 
values less than k-anonymous tables M1 and M2. However, 
the differences are not very big and the proposed k-common 
pattern tables are better in some cases, because the size of 
the original decision table is small. On the other hand, in 
Table 10  Success ratios of 
attacking decision attribute 
values by the shallow attack
k cT1 cT2 cT3 cT4 M1 M2
Dataset: car
2 0.2064 0.2064 0.2064 0.2064 0.0000 0.1913
3 0.2067 0.2067 0.2068 0.2068 0.0000 0.1913
4 0.2069 0.2068 0.2068 0.2068 0.0003 0.1914
5 0.2069 0.2069 0.2068 0.2068 0.0003 0.2220
10 0.2070 0.2070 0.2070 0.2071 0.0033 0.3722
15 0.2074 0.2074 0.2072 0.2073 0.0000 0.4198
Dataset: hayes-roth
2 0.3787 0.3783 0.3650 0.3647 0.0007 0.3563
3 0.3744 0.3628 0.3632 0.3531 0.0004 0.3451
4 0.3683 0.3572 0.3597 0.3514 0.0004 0.3473
5 0.3647 0.3569 0.3595 0.3544 0.0000 0.3854
10 0.3613 0.3584 0.3604 0.3619 0.0000 0.4317
15 0.3142 0.3142 0.3042 0.3042 0.0000 0.4057
Dataset: iris
2 0.6061 0.6067 0.5967 0.5967 0.0175 0.7662
3 0.6682 0.6654 0.6657 0.6682 0.0011 0.7506
4 0.6848 0.6816 0.6889 0.6879 0.0011 0.7334
5 0.6937 0.6947 0.6969 0.6954 0.0000 0.7334
10 0.7345 0.7349 0.7328 0.7348 0.0000 0.7121
15 0.7433 0.7470 0.7445 0.7445 0.0000 0.6981
Dataset: zoo
2 0.2890 0.2868 0.1958 0.1959 0.0012 0.2581
3 0.2784 0.2282 0.1847 0.1716 0.0001 0.2453
4 0.2586 0.1785 0.1628 0.1373 0.0000 0.2507
5 0.2415 0.1184 0.1638 0.1243 0.0000 0.2868
10 0.2211 0.1090 0.1539 0.1465 0.0000 0.4314
15 0.1889 0.1169 0.1577 0.1503 0.0000 0.5747
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Table 12, we observe that the proposed k-common pattern 
tables cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4 protect the attribute values 
more than k-anonymous table M2 but less than k-anonymous 
table M1. In Tables 12 and 11, we observe that the protection 
ability increases in the order of cT1, cT2, cT3 and cT4. This 
implies that the advantages of the adoptions of ‘minimize’ at 
step (s2) and step (s6) in the proposed data anonymization 
algorithm are more remarkable in those tables.
5  Concluding remarks
In this paper, we proposed an anonymization approach 
using imprecise rules (Inuiguchi et al. 2015; Hamakawa 
and Inuiguchi 2014). In the proposed approach, we first 
obtain k-anonymous rules each of which is supported by at 
least k objects in the given decision table. Then using the 
anonymized rules, the given decision table is anonymized 
by replacing anonymizable objects with k-common patterns 
and deleting non-anonymizable objects. Then the obtained 
table by a proposed method is called a k-common pattern 
table. Four k-commonization methods are proposed. They 
are different in the value specification level of condition 
attributes unspecified in the underlying k-anonymous rules. 
By means of numerical experiments, we demonstrated that 
the usefulness of the proposed k-common pattern tables in 
rule mining is much better than the previous k-anonymized 
decision table based on Mondrian. However, the privacy 
protection abilities of the proposed tables are worse than a 
k-anonymized decision table obtained by Mondrian with-
out consideration of classification by the decision attribute. 
The approach using Mondrian destroys the classification 
possibility of the original table drastically. The decision 
attribute value protection abilities of the proposed tables are 
comparable with a k-anonymized decision table obtained 
by Mondrian with consideration of classification by the 
decision attribute. Nevertheless, their condition attribute 
value protection abilities are worse. Considering the high 
performance of the usefulness in rule induction, the pro-
posed k-common pattern tables are applicable especially 
when the decision attribute values are sensitive and should 
be protected.
We may increase the privacy protection ability by intro-
ducing imprecise condition values for nominal/categorical 
condition attributes when we induce the set of k-anonymous 
rules. Moreover, the proposed approach is applicable only 
when we have more than two decision attribute values. One 
of the future topics is to extend the proposed approach to 
cases where the decision attribute values take only two 
values.
Table 11  Success ratios of 
attacking condition attribute 
values by shallow and deep 
attacks
k cT1 cT2 cT3 cT4 M1 M2
Dataset: car (shallow attack)
2 0.3002 0.2954 0.2895 0.2872 0.3272 0.3350
3 0.3042 0.2867 0.2816 0.2623 0.2343 0.2388
4 0.2940 0.2821 0.2531 0.2400 0.1828 0.1459
Dataset: car (deep attack)
2 0.3450 0.3323 0.2921 0.2930 0.3372 0.3366
3 0.3100 0.2849 0.2833 0.2588 0.2467 0.2388
4 0.3060 0.2816 0.2640 0.2347 0.1940 0.1459
Dataset: hayes-roth (shallow attack)
2 0.5078 0.4823 0.4557 0.4443 0.3608 0.3666
3 0.4368 0.4159 0.3991 0.3867 0.2661 0.2381
4 0.4209 0.4102 0.3749 0.3653 0.2033 0.1212
Dataset: hayes-roth (deep attack)
2 0.6326 0.6000 0.5667 0.5375 0.3894 0.3787
3 0.4957 0.4625 0.4487 0.4293 0.2861 0.2397
4 0.4757 0.4704 0.4471 0.4461 0.3747 0.1697
Dataset: iris (shallow attack)
2 0.0638 0.0639 0.0163 0.0163 0.0194 0.0108
3 0.0096 0.0096 0.0026 0.0026 0.0005 0.0002
4 0.0017 0.0016 0.0014 0.0014 0.0001 0.0001
Dataset: iris (deep attack)
2 0.0723 0.0724 0.0182 0.0182 0.0210 0.0108
3 0.0150 0.0141 0.0027 0.0027 0.0005 0.0002
4 0.0029 0.0026 0.0015 0.0015 0.0001 0.0001
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Table 12  Success ratios of 
attacking decision attribute 
values by shallow and deep 
attacks
k cT1 cT2 cT3 cT4 M1 M2
Dataset: car (shallow attack)
2 0.5449 0.5414 0.5444 0.5512 0.3052 0.7146
3 0.5524 0.5500 0.5736 0.5682 0.1751 0.7765
4 0.6127 0.6150 0.6642 0.6610 0.1373 0.8331
Dataset: car (deep attack)
2 0.5728 0.5664 0.5431 0.5451 0.3052 0.7146
3 0.5762 0.5707 0.5663 0.5668 0.1751 0.7765
4 0.6455 0.6478 0.6710 0.6684 0.1884 0.8240
Dataset: hayes-roth (shallow attack)
2 0.6113 0.6016 0.5800 0.5736 0.1108 0.5187
3 0.5322 0.5280 0.4928 0.4920 0.0250 0.5302
4 0.3918 0.3897 0.3331 0.3327 0.0249 0.5170
Dataset: hayes-roth (deep attack)
2 0.6683 0.6467 0.6238 0.6120 0.1118 0.5187
3 0.5661 0.5494 0.5454 0.5342 0.0250 0.5302
4 0.3974 0.3900 0.3647 0.3679 0.0249 0.5170
Dataset: iris (shallow attack)
2 0.8834 0.8833 0.8572 0.8572 0.0990 0.9371
3 0.8649 0.8643 0.8443 0.8435 0.0134 0.9259
4 0.8194 0.8181 0.8123 0.8115 0.0028 0.9286
Dataset: iris (deep attack)
2 0.8430 0.8434 0.8421 0.8422 0.0990 0.9371
3 0.8386 0.8380 0.8409 0.8402 0.0134 0.9259
4 0.8189 0.8170 0.8221 0.8204 0.0028 0.9286
